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SINCE THE MAJOR European currencies
became convertible for nonresidents at the
end of 1958, movements of short-term capi-
tal among international financial centers
have played an important role in the world
monetary system. Investors from all parts
of the world—private business corporations
and individuals as well as official institu-
tions and banks—have be-
come increasingly willing
to shift some of their short-
term resources from one
financial center to another
in response to changes in
market yields.
The widespread use of
the U.S. dollar as a primary
reserve and trading curren-
cy has led the authorities
in most countries (outside
the sterling area) to keep
the main part of official
holdings of foreign ex-
change in U.S. dollar assets. In addition, pri-
vate banks abroad, including branches of
U.S. banks, and corporations both here
and abroad that have been increasing their
international activities often hold short-term
balances in dollars, not only in the United
States but also with banks in foreign coun-
tries (so-called Euro-dollar deposits). At
the same time, U.S. businesses and investors
also hold some short-term investments de-
nominated in foreign currencies.
Decisions by holders to shift their re-
sources between New York and other fi-
nancial centers or between the U.S. dollar
and other currencies may affect the U.S.
balance of payments position. These shifts
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may lead to increases or reductions in the
dollar holdings of foreign monetary authori-
ties (as against those of private dollar hold-
ers) and hence may influence the U.S. gold
position.
This article discusses in general terms
interest rate relationships that might influ-
ence the investment of liquid funds in short-
term (but not long-term)
instruments in U.S. finan-
cial markets as compared
with similar markets in the
United Kingdom and Can-
ada. Even though arbitrage
is possible in either govern-
ment or private obligations,
this paper is limited to a
consideration of yields on
Treasury bills, in part be-
cause the statistical mate-
rial for bills is readily avail-
able, and in part because
bill yields are, for purposes
of international comparison, perhaps the
most representative measures of comparative
short-term money rates in these three coun-
tries. The discussion covers the period since
1958.
The statistics that accompany this article
compare weekly yields on Treasury bills be-
tween the United States and the United King-
dom and those between the United States
and Canada. These statistics will be pub-
lished regularly in the BULLETIN hereafter.
Currently, weekly figures for April 1964
through early October are given on page
1364. Back figures on a weekly basis for the
period beginning with 1959 are reproduced
1241
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on pages 1255-60. A brief technical note
describing how the yield differences have
been calculated when investments are
covered for forward exchange risks appears
on pages 1253 and 1254.
1
TREASURY BILLS AND PRIVATE
OBLIGATIONS
All international financial centers have well
developed markets in a widening range of
private and central and local government
short-term obligations. The Treasury bill
is the most important money market instru-
ment in the United States, the United King-
dom, and Canada, but in the postwar period
the variety and quantity of private short-
term instruments have increased greatly in
these countries.
In the United States, the negotiable time
certificate of deposit has been developed in
recent years, and the growth of use of such
established instruments as bankers' accept-
ances and commercial paper (that is, prom-
issory notes of prime borrowers, including
finance companies) has continued. In Can-
ada, fairly broad markets have emerged
within the past 10 years not only for Treas-
ury bills but also for commercial and finance
company paper. In the United Kingdom, de-
posits with hire-purchase (instalment credit)
institutions and, in the past few years, de-
posits with local government units now com-
pete with such traditional short-term assets
as bankers' and trade acceptances. Further-
more, banking institutions in the United
Kingdom, Canada, and elsewhere often offer
to pay higher rates of interest for U.S. cur-
rency deposits than banks in the United
States offer.
1 The statistics presented with this paper were pre-
pared by Mr. Martin Barrett of the Foreign Research
Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
and by Mr. Carl H. Stem of the European and
British Commonwealth Section of the Board's Di-
vision of International Finance.
LIMITATIONS OF TREASURY BILL
COMPARISONS
Because investors can choose among a
variety of private obligations as well as
Treasury bills, international yield differen-
tials for Treasury bills are only one of sev-
eral important measures of the incentives
that might induce short-term money flows
between financial centers.
Flows of private U.S. dollar funds into
Canadian markets, as an example, may re-
spond to differences in rates on finance
company paper or on commercial bank
time deposits in the two countries rather
than to yield differentials on Treasury bills.
Similarly, flows of funds between New York
and London may reflect changes in yields
on local-authority or hire-purchase deposits
or on deposit rates for U.S. dollars in Lon-
don as compared with the yields on negoti-
able time certificates of deposit in the United
States. For December 10-17, 1963, for ex-
ample, the spread between a U.K. hire-
purchase deposit and U.S. finance company
paper rates was about 70 basis points, while
that on Treasury bill rates was near zero.
But despite the increasing role of private
instruments in both domestic and interna-
tional markets, the Treasury bill market con-
tinues to occupy a central role among the
short-term credit markets in New York,
London, and Toronto. For purposes of in-
ternational comparison in particular, the bill
rate is considered to be the best indicator of
money market rates in these three financial
centers, although this does not mean that in-
ternational flows of funds are to be found
chiefly in Treasury bills.
A major reason for the central role of
the Treasury bill is the substantial volume
of domestic trading in these bills each day,
which makes the rate on them the most
widely quoted of all short-term rates.
As compared with the Treasury bill, other
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money market obligations are less homoge-
neous, and their markets are more restricted.
Their quotations are less readily available,
and the selection of a representative price
may often be somewhat arbitrary. Much of
the time, moreover, changes in rates on
short-term private instruments tend to ac-
company changes in rates on Treasury bills.
2
INTEREST RATES AND FORWARD
EXCHANGE MARGINS
Movements of short-term funds among in-
ternational centers help to smooth the oper-
ation of a system of convertible currencies
although, on occasion, they may have dis-
turbing effects upon financial markets. Such
movements may bring the costs of compara-
ble types of credit—and the levels of short-
term interest rates in general—more closely
into alignment in various centers. In addi-
tion, they may have a substantial influence
upon exchange rates for major currencies.
The concept of "interest parities." When a
bank sells a foreign currency to a customer
for future delivery, it may cover its commit-
ment in one of two ways: (a) it may con-
tract to buy the currency at the future date;
or (b) it may buy the currency immediately,
that is, make a spot purchase. Since the bank
can usually put at interest in the foreign
center any spot exchange it may buy, its
choice between these alternatives may well
be based on whether the difference between
the amount of interest to be earned in the
foreign center and that on a domestic in-
vestment is greater (or less) than the exist-
ing discount or premium on the forward
price of the foreign currency (compared
with the spot price).
2 In theory, the differentials between yields on
Treasury bills and those on private obligations in
any financial center should tend to equalize the dif-
ferences in risks, in transactions costs, and in liquidity;
in practice, however, special factors may produce
significant variations over time in the yield spread
between the Treasury bill and private debt obligations.
Because participants in foreign exchange
operations have this choice, significance at-
taches to the relationship between the inter-
est rate differentials in two centers on the
one hand and the margin between spot and
forward exchange rates on the other.
In fact, the proposition has long been held
that, when currencies are fully convertible
and conditions are normal, the margin be-
tween spot and forward quotations for one
currency in terms of a second will tend to
be closely related to the differentials in in-
terest rates between the two centers. More
specifically, the difference between the for-
ward and spot exchange quotations for any
currency in terms of a second (expressed in
terms of per cent per annum) should roughly
offset the difference between representative
short-term interest rates in the two centers.
Other things being equal, any significant
gap between the forward exchange margin
and the yield differential between two cen-
ters on comparable investments provides an
incentive for profitable arbitrage by inves-
tors. If, as an illustration, the 3-month
Treasury bill had a yield of 4 per cent in
London and only 2 per cent in New York,
the dollar price of the 3-month forward
pound should be below the price of the spot
pound by an amount equivalent to a 2 per
cent yield on an annual basis. Should the
forward pound actually be below the spot
pound by an amount equivalent to a per
annum difference of 1 per cent, an investor
could earn 1 per cent more on his money by
shifting funds from New York to London on
a covered basis.
This mechanism would cause the forward
quotation for the currency of a center with
high interest rates to be below the spot quo-
tation, that is, at a discount, and the forward
rate for the currency in the low interest-rate
country to be at a premium, that is, above
the spot rate.
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But the very act of shifting funds into the
higher-yielding center is an influence tending
to reduce the assumed net (covered)
differential in its favor. In our example, the
arbitrageur would buy pounds spot and use
them to purchase Treasury bills in London;
at the same time, he would sell forward the
pounds he would receive when the bills
matured. These two exchange transactions
would tend to widen the discount on the for-
ward pound and thus to narrow the net yield
differential on Treasury bills.
The incentive to make arbitrage trans-
actions would remain until the discount on
the forward pound approached the 2 per
cent differential in bill rates. When the dis-
count approximately offsets the interest dif-
ferential, the forward exchange rate is said
to be at "interest parity," at least with re-
spect to Treasury bills. At the various in-
terest parities (that is, where the forward
discount or premium offsets interest differ-
entials on comparable money market obli-
gations between two centers), temporary
shifts of funds are not profitable.
Effect of interest changes on forward ex-
change rates. When an abrupt change occurs
in the Treasury bill yield in one center, the
effect on the forward exchange quotation
for that country's currency is often marked
and immediate. In many cases the spread
between the forward and spot rates moves
promptly in the opposite direction, because
of the changed expectations of participants
in the foreign exchange market, and this may
happen before there is time for any volume
of short-term funds to be shifted. As a con-
sequence, changes in the forward discount
(or premium)—rather than international
movements of funds—may be a key balanc-
ing factor in bringing interest and exchange
rates between two centers into alignment.
In the process of adjustment, an early
change in the forward exchange margin
(offsetting a change in interest rates) can
itself restore balance between net yields on
comparable short-term debt instruments in
two centers, even though absolute differ-
ences in the levels of interest rates remain.
In this way, the absolute levels of interna-
tional interest rates can differ substantially,
in response to local economic conditions,
without necessarily inducing undesired in-
ternational flows of capital.
In fact, if it were not for the exchange
risks that induce investors to sell forward
the proceeds of their foreign currency in-
vestments, interest rates would have to be
closely aligned in international centers
(when currencies were convertible and pri-
vate funds were free to move). If they were
not so aligned, there would presumably be
a tendency for funds to move to centers with
high interest rates at any time when signifi-
cant differences in rates prevailed. But con-
tinued shifting of this kind would, at some
point, require the monetary authorities in
those countries that were losing private
capital to raise domestic money rates as a
protective measure.
Because of the desirability of covering
the exchange risk, however, demand for
forward cover can widen the exchange mar-
gin enough to offset the gross differences in
interest rate levels. In this way, fluctuations
in forward exchange rates reduce the likeli-
hood that the monetary authorities in finan-
cial centers may be forced to adjust local
market interest rates to developments in for-
eign markets, to the exclusion of domestic
business considerations.
Other factors affecting forward rates. But
many factors other than differences in inter-
est rates affect the demand for and supply
of forward exchange, and from time to time
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these are a predominant influence upon for-
ward rates. Among them are cyclical, and
even seasonal, deterioration in a country's
balance of payments; domestic inflation; or
other adverse economic or political devel-
opments, perhaps of a temporary character.
Or, no less important, uncertainties about
the future value of a currency may exert
effects on forward exchange quotations that
are unrelated to relative interest rates.
Even in circumstances when forward rates
are not determined primarily by such inde-
pendent factors as these, the effects of inter-
est rate differences may be limited because
of obstacles to the shifting of funds from
one center to another. In many countries
exchange controls and other regulations still
impede the international mobility of private
capital.
In addition, changes in the liquidity of
commercial banks, and of private institu-
tions and individuals, may affect their re-
sponse to more favorable profit opportuni-
ties abroad. Commercial banks may decide
to employ available liquid funds in domes-
tic transactions, and individual investors
may prefer a domestic investment because
it would be less costly to liquidate before
maturity, in case of need.
Finally, there are cost, risk, and even tax
considerations associated with a decision to
invest abroad. Usually a significant differen-
tial in net return is required to induce inves-
tors to shift from a domestic to a foreign
asset. In each instance, the individual inves-
tor must balance the additional return
against the disadvantages of placing his
funds in a foreign center.
INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN
TREASURY BILL YIELDS: 1959-64
From time to time over the past 5 years,
there have been substantial differences be-
tween yields on U.S. Treasury bills and
those on U.K. bills and between U.S. and
Canadian yields, as shown in the charts on
pages 1246 and 1247. This has been true,
whether the differences are measured with or
without the cost of forward cover.
As would be expected, the differentials
are much greater when the bill yields alone
are compared than they are when the cost of
forward cover is included. The periods when
gaps between the U.S. Treasury bill rate and
the rates for U.K. and Canadian bills were
substantial may be summarized as follows:
Without forward cover:
U.K. rate Early 1960 to mid-1962
(Much of 1959
Canadian rate <Late I960 and early 1961
(June-Nov., 1962
With forward cover:
TT K rate i Mid-1960 to early 1961
(Mid-1961
Canadian rate -|^ J^n * A 1ftO /Late 1960 and early 1961
The periods of substantial gap without ex-
change cover do not always coincide with
the periods when the covered spreads are
appreciable. On some occasions a wide gap
in the uncovered yield seems to have been
offset by changes in forward rates, as the
concept of interest parity would suggest;
in these circumstances there was no covered
differential. On other occasions an appreci-
able covered gap has existed.
The large differentials in comparative bill
yields without forward cover, which are
shown in Chart 1, appear to have been due
chiefly to two principal factors. In the first
place, business trends in this country have
differed from those in the United Kingdom
and in Canada, and these differences in
timing of the economic cycle have tended to
produce diverging tendencies in gross in-
terest levels. The contrasting trend in bill
rates in the United States and the United
Kingdom in the first half of 1960 reflected
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this. The second cause of variations in in-
terest rates can be found in balance of pay-
ments deteriorations. These caused the
authorities in Canada in 1962 and those in
the United Kingdom in 1960 and again in
1961 to raise their discount rates and to use
other monetary measures as part of their
general stabilization efforts to defend the
foreign exchange value of their respective
currencies.
In addition, special conditions in Cana-
dian financial markets, rather than diverging
business trends, produced a wide gap be-
tween Canadian and U.S. bill yields on two
occasions: in mid-1959 when a rapid loan
expansion was under way, and in late 1960
when there was a general advance in yields
in Canadian markets.
But differing trends in uncovered bill
yields among these three countries would
not have produced significant gaps in net
covered yields had forward exchange rates
been influenced primarily by interest rate
considerations. The existence of a covered
spread, whether the uncovered gap in bill
yields is small or appreciable, would indicate
the impact of noninterest factors on forward
exchange rates.
Periods of weakening in the balance of
payments, for example, often produced un-
usual movements in forward exchange rates,
which were themselves responsible for a
temporary widening in net (covered) inter-
est differentials. There was a net differential
of 2 per cent per annum against the British
bill in mid-1961 when the pound was under
selling pressures. And there was a spread of
over 1 per cent per annum in its favor in the
latter half of 1960, when funds were being
shifted into London financial markets, in
part because market participants were con-
cerned about the U.S. payments situation at
that time.
Diverging U.S.-U.K. cyclical trends in 1960.
Throughout most of 1959, parallel business
trends here and in Britain helped to keep
Treasury bill levels in the two countries close
together, both on a covered and on an un-
covered basis. The net covered differential
was 50 basis points or less on 52 out of the
53 Fridays in 1959, as Chart 2 shows.
The substantial yield gap that emerged
during 1960 reflected opposite trends in
business activity in the two countries. Credit
conditions diverged gradually during the
early part of 1960, but a dramatic spread
developed around midyear. On January 21
the Bank of England raised its discount rate
from 4 to 5 per cent. A further rise—to 6
per cent—came on June 23. By contrast,
rates in this country were moving down.
Earlier in June the Federal Reserve discount
rate was reduced from 4 to 3Y2 per cent,
in the process of a cyclical easing of credit
market conditions, and to 3 per cent in mid-
August.
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The spread in bill yields for several
months thereafter was the widest recorded
for the period under review. The British bill
rate exceeded the U.S. bill rate by 3 per-
centage points during 11 weeks in 1960 and
14 weeks in 1961. Even after allowing for
the cost of forward exchange, the gap ex-
ceeded 1 percentage point during 20 weeks
in 1960.
Wide spreads in both short- and long-term
interest rates between London and New
York produced a substantial inflow of
money to London in the second half of
1960, largely from North America and
Western Europe. These inflows masked the
effect on Britain's reserves of the deteriora-
tion in the underlying trade account, which
was brought on by booming demand at
home and a building up of stocks of im-
ported goods. These flows also reflected
concern about prospects for U.S. external
payments at that time.
Late in 1960 the British authorities pro-
ceeded to ease money rates because they
thought that the continuing large move-
ments of volatile funds to London were not
in the interest of the United Kingdom. In
this process the Bank of England reduced
its discount rate to 5Vi per cent on Octo-
ber 27 and to 5 per cent on December 8.
Interest rates in London during foreign ex-
change crisis of 1961. Weakness in Britain's
external position became evident in the
aftermath of the revaluations of the German
mark and the Netherlands guilder in March
1961. Britain's exports had not increased
enough to strengthen its balance of pay-
ments or to improve market opinion about
the outlook for the pound. The forward
pound weakened in May and June, and
there were reports of large movements of
private funds out of London.
Because of the deteriorating external
position, a sweeping stabilization pro-
gram was announced on July 25, 1961. As
one part of this program, the Bank of Eng-
land's discount rate was raised from 5 to
7 per cent. The Treasury bill rate jumped
from 4.63 per cent on July 21 to 6.69 per
cent on August 4.
The various stabilization measures and
the international credits announced at the
time produced a dramatic change in Britain's
economic position. Commercial bank loans
declined sharply during August and Septem-
ber. And more normal conditions returned
to the foreign exchange market.
By early October, in fact, balance of pay-
ments conditions had improved sufficiently
for the authorities to take steps to reduce
short-term rates from the exceptionally high
levels then prevailing. The discount rate was
reduced successively to 6V2 per cent on
October 5 and to 6 per cent on November
2; and then during 1962 to 5Vz per cent
on March 8, 5 per cent on March 22, and
AV2 per cent on April 26.
Special conditions in Canadian markets in
1959. From February to August of 1959,
yields on Canadian bills advanced rapidly,
and those on U.S. Treasury bills remained
almost stable. The wide margin in favor of
the Canadian Treasury bill reflected dif-
ferences in financial conditions rather than
differences in business trends—for output
was advancing steadily in a general recovery
in both countries. Financial markets were
under greater pressure in Canada in this
period than they were in the United States.
During the preceding year, 1958, a large
monetary expansion had occurred in Canada
in the course of a massive debt refunding
operation by the Canadian government. The
money supply (currency and total deposits)
expanded by 16 per cent from August 1957
to October 1958, and the banks greatly
enlarged their government security holdings.
During 1959 a rapid expansion of loans
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began. Customers drew upon lines of credit
authorized by the banks, both before and
after the business recovery got under way.
To finance this expansion, the banks sold
government securities. At the same time
the Canadian government was raising funds
in credit markets to finance a large deficit.
Canadian banks sought during this period
to slow down the growth in their loans. By
mid-August, when pressures reached their
peak, bank loans were $1,200 million, or
23 per cent, above the year-earlier level.
The pressures on credit availabilities—
stemming from: (1) bank sales of securities
to finance the growth in loans, (2) efforts
by the authorities to meet the Treasury's
cash needs, and (3) the attempts by the
central bank to damp down the pace of
credit expansion—converged on the Treas-
ury bill market during the spring of 1959.
As a result, the bill yield moved upward
throughout the second quarter, from 3.78
per cent in mid-February to around 5.00 per
cent in mid-June.
Bill yields in Canada climbed further in
July. Strains in the bill market reached a
climax when a record 6.16 per cent rate was
announced at the August 13 tender. In an
unusual action the Canadian authorities re-
fused to accept tenders for all the bills on
offer at the August 20 tender and reduced
the amount of bills on offer for the next week
because "the recent rise in interest rates on
Treasury bills had gone farther and faster
than conditions warrant." On these grounds,
they rejected bids on 23 per cent ($31 mil-
lion) of the original tender. For the remain-
der the average yield was 6.04 per cent.
After that, strains in the Canadian bill
market relaxed and the bill yield gradually
declined. However, in the aftermath of the
mid-August crisis the forward Canadian
dollar continued to show weakness during
the remainder of 1959; this factor, together
with a sharp rise in the U.S. bill yield from
around 3 per cent in early August to 4.50
per cent in December shifted the advantage
from the Canadian to the U.S. bill.
Spread in Canadian-U.S. yields in late 1960.
Conditions in Canadian financial markets
again produced a wide gap in bill yields in
late 1960. The relative strength of the for-
ward Canadian dollar may also have re-
flected concern about trends in the U.S. bal-
ance of payments.
An abrupt shift in conditions in Canadian
financial markets in early October of that
year produced a rapid rise in the yield on
Canadian Treasury bills. This temporary
rise was part of a rapid and general advance
in Canadian interest rates during the fourth
quarter, brought on by a reluctance of in-
vestors to purchase medium-term and long-
term bonds in quantity at prevailing market
yields. At the time, yields on both Govern-
ment bonds and on Treasury bills moved
rapidly upward.
These pressures proved short-lived, how-
ever, and Canadian market yields began to
move down in late 1960. By mid-1961, in
fact, the yield on the Canadian bill was once
again close to the U.S. bill rate.
Canadian balance of payments crisis in
mid-1962. The yields on U.S. and Canadian
bills again diverged in mid-1962 when de-
velopments in the foreign exchange market
—rather than cyclical credit demands or
disturbances in Canadian financial markets
—produced a sharp rise in rates on Cana-
dian Treasury bills.
In the first half of 1962 the Canadian
balance of payments deteriorated as the net
inflow of long-term capital into Canada vir-
tually ceased and Canadian residents in-
creased their short-term foreign currency
holdings by $245 million. Between early
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January and June 24, Canada's official re-
serves fell from (U.S.) $2,056 million to
(U.S.) $1,100 million.
A crisis in foreign exchange markets fol-
lowed this deterioration in the balance of
payments. Conditions in other financial mar-
kets became unsettled. Upward pressures on
market yields became general in late May
and in June, when both the chartered banks
and nonbank investors reduced their hold-
ings of government securities.
On June 24 the Canadian authorities in-
troduced a comprehensive program of emer-
gency measures to end the reserve losses and
to defend the Canadian dollar at 92.5 U.S.
cents, the new fixed par value introduced
on May 2. The setting of the discount rate of
the Bank of Canada at 6 per cent was among
the important steps taken in the stabilization
effort. Also included were measures to re-
duce foreign payments and steps to curtail
domestic spending. In addition, the author-
ities announced some $1.05 billion of inter-
national financial assistance from the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund.
Shortly after the emergency program was
announced, yields throughout the whole
maturity range of Canadian government se-
curities leveled off at around 5.5 per cent in
mid-July. Then, toward the end of the sum-
mer, market interest rates began to ease.
Once under way the decline was rapid, and
by September the Treasury bill rate had de-
clined to 5 per cent. The Bank of Canada's
discount rate was then rapidly brought down
in several steps: to 5Vi per cent on Septem-
ber 7, to 5 per cent on October 12, and to 4
per cent on November 13.
After late November and in much of
1963, the yield on Treasury bills was around
3.60 per cent. Following the advances in
U.S. bill rates in June 1963, in fact, the
Canadian and U.S. bill yields have moved
closely together.
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1962
Between 1959 and mid-1962, diverging eco-
nomic developments on occasion produced
wide variations in conditions in financial
markets in the three countries considered in
this paper, and short-term rates also di-
verged. Since late 1962, rates in the three
countries have moved more closely together.
After European countries achieved non-
resident convertibility for their currencies at
the end of 1958, a continuing integration of
international short-term money markets was
to be expected. This development implied
not only closer relationships among markets
in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Canada but also a gradual integration
of continental European financial markets
with those in these three countries. The re-
moval of many restrictions on movements of
short-term funds and on foreign borrowing,
and the development in London and else-
where of a substantial market for the bor-
rowing and lending of U.S. dollars, helped
to accelerate this process of international
integration.
During this period the monetary authori-
ties in the principal western countries fur-
thered the integration trend. With most cur-
rencies convertible for nonresidents—and
in the case of Canada, with a fixed par value
for the currency restored—these authorities
recognized that international considerations
had to be accorded somewhat greater weight
in making decisions about short-term inter-
est rates than formerly.
In the United States, where the balance
of payments has been a consideration, at-
tempts were made to maintain or raise short-
term rates without at the same time putting
direct pressure on long-term rates. On the
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other side, some European countries with
payments surpluses and with strong domes-
tic business expansion were cautious in their
use of monetary restraints on domestic mar-
kets, so as to avoid unwanted inflows of
short-term capital.
To this end also, special reserve require-
ments against foreign deposits were set up,
and a wide range of direct measures were
used to discourage, or to prohibit altogether,
short-term capital flows from abroad.
Finally, the monetary authorities in the
western countries have attempted to achieve
closer international financial cooperation
and greater payments stability through joint
consultation in such bodies as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development,
the Bank for International Settlements and,
recently, in the meetings of financial officials
of the major industrial countries in the
Group of Ten. In addition, the monetary
authorities have worked out reciprocal cur-
rency agreements and other central banking
credits, the international gold pool, and
other intergovernmental measures of inter-
national cooperation.
These official efforts have contributed to
the process by which financial markets have
tended to draw more closely together during
the past few years. Nonetheless, it is highly
significant that the recent confluence of
short-term money rates also reflects the ab-
sence of economic stresses such as those that
produced wide differentials in rates between
1959 and 1962.
The severe balance of payments stresses
experienced in 1961 and in 1962 have not
recurred. Nor has there been any marked
divergence in business trends between the
United States and other western countries
such as those experienced in 1960. Since
1963, the steady expansion in business ac-
tivity in the United States has been accom-
panied by parallel tendencies in Canada and
in western European countries.
These circumstances have been favorable
to the efforts of western monetary authori-
ties to link more closely the principal inter-
national financial markets.
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TECHNICAL NOTE
The treasury bill yields and foreign ex-
change quotations used in computing the in-
terest arbitrage data shown on pages 1255-
60 are quotations that prevailed in the
financial markets at the times and dates indi-
cated. The foreign exchange quotations used
to compute the forward discount or premium
are those that prevailed in the interbank
market in New York as reported to the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York by market
sources. Quotations to bank customers nor-
mally would differ from these interbank
rates.
Hence, the interest arbitrage incentives
shown in these tables provide only an ap-
proximate indication of the covered differ-
ences in treasury bill yields in the specified
markets. They do not precisely coincide, for
example, with quotations of covered yields
on the offer sheets of U.S. commercial banks
for Canadian and British Treasury bills.
A further source of differences between
yields shown in the tables and those some-
times quoted in the market is that the U.K.
and Canadian Treasury bill yields have been
adjusted in this series to make them more
comparable with quotations in the New
York market. This results in a change of
some 3 to 8 basis points in the yields and
gives yields that are somewhat more com-
parable than the unadjusted market quota-
tions. However, it means that yields cited
here will not match those shown on market
offer sheets, where such an adjustment usu-
ally is not made.
The U.S. Treasury bill yield currently
used in the arbitrage calculations is com-
puted from the quotation at 11:00 a.m. on
the latest issue of 91-day bills offered in the
New York market. The U.K. bill yield is
currently computed from quotations on bills
offered in the London market on the same
day (the quotation is actually received in
New York before 9:00 a.m. New York
time) and is adjusted from a 365-day to a
360-day basis to be comparable with yields
on the 360-day U.S. bill. For example, on
October 9, 1964, the rate for the U.S. bill
was 3.56 per cent, compared with the ad-
justed rate of 4.53 per cent for the U.K. bill.
The gross incentive was 97 basis points in
favor of London.
Computation of the premium or discount
on the forward pound sterling is currently
based on 11:00 a.m. quotations for spot
and forward sterling in the New York mar-
ket. Continuing our example, spot sterling
was 278.33 U.S. cents bid and 278.35 U.S.
cents offered, and 3-month forward sterling
was 277.79 U.S. cents bid and 277.83 U.S.
cents offered on October 9, 1964. The mid-
dle rate between the bid and offer quota-
tions is computed for both spot and forward
sterling. As the following formula shows, the
difference between these two middle rates is
computed as a percentage of the middle rate
for spot to obtain the 3-month discount on
forward sterling. The resulting figure, multi-
plied by four, gives the annual figure.
278.34^ — 277.8 H
278.34^
X 4 = 0.760% per annum
The covered interest arbitrage computa-
tion on the U.K. Treasury bill compared
with the U.S. Treasury bill for October 9,
1964, is figured as follows:






Discount on forward pound 0.76
Net yield in favor of London 0.21
A similar, though somewhat more com-
plicated, computation must be made for the
Canadian Treasury bill. The Canadian bill
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is quoted not only on a 365-day year, but
also on a "true yield" basis and not on the
discount basis used in the U.S. market. On
October 9, 1964, for example, the Canadian
bill was quoted at 3.67 per cent in Canada.
Converted for arbitrage purposes to a dis-
count basis and to a 360-day year, the yield
becomes 3.59 per cent per annum, or about
3 basis points above the U.S. bill. In the
foreign exchange market, the spot Canadian
dollar was bid at 92.969 cents and offered
at 93.000 cents in New York, the midpoint
being 92.984 cents. Similarly, the 3-month
forward dollar was bid at 92.906 cents and
offered at 92.969 cents, the midpoint being
92.938 cents. The discount on the forward
Canadian dollar was 0.198 per cent on a
yearly basis. The covered interest arbitrage
computation on the Canadian Treasury bill
compared with the U.S. Treasury bill on that
date is then calculated as follows:






Discount on forward Canadian
dollar 0.20
Net yield in favor of
New York .17
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For notes see end of table.
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For notes see end of table.
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NOTE.—U.K. Treasury bills {adjusted to U.S. quotation basis):
Rates in London for 91-day bills, which are quoted on a 365-day
discount basis (i.e., interest equals 365/91 X 100 minus the dis-
count price divided by 100), adjusted to make them more comparable
with the U.S. Treasury bill yield, which is computed on a 360-day dis-
count basis (i.e., 1=360/91 X 100 —discount price divided by 100).
Rates are average Friday tender, Jan. 2, 1959-June 24, 1960; there-
after computed from market offer quotations prior to 11 a.m. Friday.
U.S. Treasury bills: Market offer rates at 11 a.m. Friday in New
York for 91-day bills.
Premium or discount on the forward pound sterling: Rates per annum,
computed on the basis of the midpoint quotation (midpoint between
bid and offer) for both spot and forward pounds sterling in New
York. Rates are those at noon on Friday for the period Jan. 2,
1959-Dec. 27, 1963; and at 11 a.m. on Friday thereafter.
All series: Except for rates on U.K. Treasury bills through June 24,
1960 (which are from the Economist), all series are based on quotations
reported to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York by market
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TABLE 2. ARBITRAGE ON U.S. AND CANADIAN TREASURY BILLS






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For notes see end of table.
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TABLE 2. ARBITRAGE ON U.S. AND CANADIAN TREASURY BILLS—Continued































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For notes see end of table.
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NOTE.—Canadian Treasury bills (quoted in Canada): Rates for
91-day bills are average Thursday tender, Jan. 2, 1959-Dcc. 27, 1962;
and Friday (11 a.m.) market offer, Jan. 4, 1963, to date.
Canadian Treasury bills {adjusted to U.S. quotation basis): Rates
for 91-day bills (described above) which are quoted in Canada on a
365-day true yield basis (i.e., interest equals 365/91 X 100 minus dis-
count price divided by discount price) are adjusted to make them
comparable with the U.S. Treasury bill yield, which is computed on a
360-day discount basis (i.e., 1=360/91 X 100-discount price di-
vided by 100).
U.S. Treasury bills: Market offer rates in New York for 91-day
bills. Rates are those at 11 a.m. Thursday, Jan. 2, 1959-Dec. 27,
1962; thereafter at 11 a.m. Friday.
Premium or discount on the forward Canadian dollar: Rates per
annum, computed on basis of the midpoint quotations (midpoint
between bid and offer) for both spot and forward Canadian dollars
in New York. Rates are those at noon on Thursday for the period
Jan. 2, 1959-Dec. 27, 1962; at noon on Friday for the period Jan. 4,
1963-Dec. 27, 1963; and at 11 a.m. on Friday thereafter.
All series: Except for rates on Canadian bills for period Jan. 2,
1959-Dec. 27, 1962 (which are from Weekly Financial Statistics,
Bank of Canada), all series are based on quotations reported to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York by market sources.
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